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ON "COMPARATIVE" AND
"CONTRASTIVE" LAW*
Jerome Frank I
As I'm talking after a dinner preceded by a kind of liquidity which
economists have not considered, I'm reminded of a sentence in Sterne's
Tristram Shandy: "The ancient Goths of Germany had . . . a wise
custom of debating twice everything of importance to the state. That
is, once drunk and once sober: Drunk, that their councils might not
lack vigor; and sober, that they might not want discretion." I
Because of the evil potentialities of the H-bomb, perhaps it's
folly for anyone to discuss "civil law influences on the common law."
One recalls Anatole France's remark: "We should conceive a positive
pity for our economists arguing with one another about the cost of
the furniture in a burning house." 2 But we must assume that this
globe and its inhabitants will continue to exist; and maybe sympathetic
studies of "foreign law" will help to ensure that existence.
* A paper (here somewhat expanded) read before the American Foreign Law
Association, New York City, Feb. 17, 1955.
t Judge, United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit; Visiting Lecturer in
Law, Yale Law School. Ph.B., 1910, J.D., 1912, LL.D., 1953, University of Chicago.
1. Edmond Calm has called my attention to the fact that Sterne lifted this
passage almost bodily from Herodotus.
2. FRANCE, THE OPIOxs op JEnomE COIGNARD 26 (Jackson transl. 1913).
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INSTANCES OF INFLUENCE
Constitutional Law
The influences of civil law on common law are legion. Many of
them doubtlessly can't be detected. But a few years ago, the incom-
parable Max Radin did an excellent detective job.3 He examined the
source of what seemed to many a distinctively Anglo-American legal
precept, "A man's house is his castle," eloquently explained in Pitt's
Speech on the Excise Bill: "The poorest man may in his cottage bid
defiance to all the force of the Crown. It may be frail, its roof may
shake; the wind may blow through it; the storms may enter, the rain
may enter-but the King of England cannot enter; all his forces dare
not cross the threshold of the ruined tenement." 4 According to the
conventional tale Coke first uttered this house-castle precept," but
Radin points out that Coke quoted a Latin passage I taken almost ver-
batim from the Digest,7 based on Gaius' Commentaries on the Twelve
Tables.' He notes that the famous phrase had been used by English-
men twice before Coke, once in a book published in 1574 in which the
author cited as its source the Roman poet Terence.9 At any rate,
we Americans enshrined the Roman-made house-castle doctrine in
the fourth amendment to our Constitution.
Conflict of Laws
In the modem era, repeatedly our common-law doctrines of conflict
of laws have been enriched-and sometimes confused-by studies of
3. Radin, The Rivalry of Common Law and Civil Law Ideas in the American
Colonies, in 2 LAW: A CENTURY OF PROGRESS 404 (Reppy ed. 1937).
4. Quoted in Radin, id. at 426.
5. See Bowles' Case, 11 Co. 79b, 82b, 77 Eng. Rep. 1252, 1253 (K.B. 1616);
Semayne's Case, 5 Co. 91a, 91b, 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 195 (K.B. 1605).
6. Radin, supra note 3, at 424. England had three "receptions" of Roman law.
See L&W-ULLMANN, THE ENGLISH LEGAL TRADITION 169-203 (1935). For a con-
venient summary, with bibliography, of Roman and civil law influences, direct and
indirect, on the common law, see WNIED, THE- CHr= SoURcES op ENGLISH LEGAL
HISTORY 54-69 (1925). Legal historians easily trace Roman law influences on-to
mention but a few English lawyers-Glanvil in the 12th century, Bracton in the
13th century, Fortescue in the 15th, Saint Germain and Plowden in the 16th, Fulbecke
and Seldon in the 17th, Mansfield in the 18th and Austin and Maine in the 19th.
L~VY-ULLMANN, op. cit. supra at xxxiii-xxxiv, 129-39, 174-82, 201.
7. Darlington, in 1948, suggested that "we need a Ministry of Disturbance, a
regulated destroyer of routine, an underminer of complacency." Radin might well
have served in that post
8. Radin might have noted that, in 1748, Montesquieu wrote: "Both the Roman
and our laws admit of this principle . . . that every man ought to have his own
house for an asylum, where he would suffer no violence." 2 MONTESQuiEu, THE
SPIRIT OF LAWS bk. xxix, c. 10 (Neumann ed. 1949).
9. Radin, supra note 3, at 425. This recalls the fact that, it is said, Terence first
employed the equivalent of the phrase summunM jus summum injuria.
"COMPARATIVE" AND "CONTRASTIVE" LAW
continental doctrines. Story, in his work in that legal province as
elsewhere, owed much to civilians.'0 He liked the idea of jus gentium.
In his famous Swift v. Tyson " opinion-establishing a doctrine now
unhappily dead, thanks to Brandeis-he said in 1842: "The law re-
specting negotiable instruments may be truly declared in the languages
of Cicero . . to be in great measure, not the law of a single country
only, but of the commercial world." 1 He quoted Cicero's famous
lines: "There will not be different laws at Rome and Athens, or dif-
ferent laws now and in the future, but one and the same law will be
valid for all nations and at all times." 1
Contracts
We must be grateful to Hitler for some gifts to us he never in-
tended. He sent us many eminent continental legal scholars who have
imported invaluable continental ideas. I shan't try here to list them,
but I note that Kessler and Ehrenzweig have taught us to reflect on
the nature and consequences of so-called "contracts of adhesion," '" a
label invented in France by Salleille. I venture the guess that, before
long, the Kessler-Ehrenzweig views about such contracts will substan-
tially affect American decisions.115
Statutory Interpretation
It is frequently noted that civilians use, and we do not, the
analogical method of interpreting a statute. Yet even that difference
is beginning to wear thin, for one sees signs that the old concept of
the "equity-of-the-statute" may be enjoying a revival here. Plowden,
in sixteenth century England, explicitly voiced that concept and in
doing so quoted Aristotle to the effect that: "Whenever . . . the
statute reads in general terms but a case arises which is not covered
by the general statement, then it is right, where the legislator's rule
is inadequate because of its oversimplicity, to correct the omission
which the legislator, if he were present, would admit, and, had he known
10. For Story's influence, in turn, on some civilian ideas of conflict of laws, see
Vallad o, The Influence of Joseph Story on Latin-American Rides of Conflict of
Laws, 3 Am. J. Comp. L. 27 (1954).
11. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
12. Id. at 18.
13. "Non erit alia lex Romae, alia Athenis; alia nunc, alia posthac; sed et apud
onmes gentes, et omni tempore una eademque lex obtinebit." Ibid.
14. Contracts of adhesion are also called "take-it-or-leave-it" contracts. An
illustrative example is insurance contracts.
15. I urged acceptance of their views in a recent dissenting opinion. Siegelman v.
Cunard White Star, Ltd., 221 F.2d 189, 204-05 (2d Cir. 1955).
1956]
890 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 104
it, would have put into his statute." ' Here Plowden, a Roman Cath-
olic, was almost surely affected by continental canonists.
Modern American lawyers, until recently, treated the equity-of-
the-statute concept as moribund if not dead, but, in 1934, Landis en-
thusiastically espoused it." He purported to find its source in the
Year Books, but Professor Thorne has cast doubts on this derivation
from those Year Book citations.18 Nevertheless, Chief Justice Stone
wrote an article in 1936 in accord with Landis' idea. 9 And in 1937
Cardozo, without referring by name to the equity-of-the-statute, spoke
of a "legislative policy which is itself a source of law, a new generative
impulse transmitted to the legal system." 20 In 1940 Crawford said
that, according to the wiser view, a statute ". . . merely lays down
a general guide and leaves the court wide leeway within which to deal
with individual cases as the justice of the case demands"; the best
the legislature can do ". . . is to lay down a general rule or guide
or policy, and leave to the courts the duty of dealing with specific cases
according to the ethical considerations involved, where the statute is
not precise enough to cover the problem before it." 2
This reminds one of Hake who, in an early seventeenth century
English treatise on equity-republished in 1953-suggested that a
judge who did not "equitably" interpret a statute had violated his oath
and should be removed.22  Perhaps Hake was right. However, we
all know some American lawyers who think such a notion sinful. They
resemble those early English judges who thought the word "interpreta-
tion" connoted fraud or evasion.'
Aristotle's theory of interpretation affected Roman law 4 and
thence permeated modern civil law. Article I of the Swiss Civil Code
16. Eyston v. Studd, 2 Plowden 459, 465-69, 75 Eng. Rep. 688, 695-700 (C.B.
1574).
17. Landis, Statutes and the Sources of Law, in HARvARD LEGAL ESSAYS 213
(1934).
18. Thorne, Introduction, in A DISCOURSE UPON THE STATUTES (Thorne ed.
1942).
19. Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 HARV. L. Rxv. 4, 13-14
(1936).
20. Van Beeck v. Sabine Towing Co., 300 U.S. 342, 350-51 (1937); cf. South
& Cent. Am. Commercial Co. v. Panama R.R., 237 N.Y. 287, 291, 142 N.E. 666, 667
(1923). See also Gooch v. Oregon Short Line R.R., 258 U.S. 22, 24 (1922) ; Slifka v.
Johnson, 161 F.2d 467, 469-70 (2d Cir. 1947) (concurring opinion).
21. CRAwFoRD, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 243, 244 (1940). As to the courts'
determinations of the applicable "ethical considerations," see CAHN, THE MORAL
DECISION (1955); LLOYD, PUBLIC POLICY 125-29, 146 (1953); PATrmFsox, Juis-
PRUDENCE 232-35 (1953); Repouille v. United States, 165 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1947).
22. HAKE, EP ExEiA 29, 42 (1953).
23. PLUCKNETT, CONCISE HISTORY OF THE Com ON LAW 311 (4th ed. 1948).
24. Kiss, Equity and Law, in THE SCIENCE OF LEGaAL METHOD 146 (1917).
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of 1907 adopted the Aristotelian theory, with some modification. 25
Cardozo, in 1920, said that this Swiss provision "well expressed" the
"tone and temper in which the modern judge should set about his
task." 28 Justice Jackson, in a dissenting opinion in 1942, referred
to article I of the Swiss Code as in effect a "candid recognition of
what necessarily is the practice" of courts.2 7  My great colleague
Learned Hand, in 1933-at a time (so he tells me) when he had not
read Aristotle-applied almost literally the Aristotelian precept, not
only to statutes but also to the interpretation of judicial precedents.28
Terminology
The medieval schoolmen, steeped in Roman law as they knew it,
left an important heritage to common-law lawyers. As Nicholas St.
John Green said: "A large proportion of the abstract terms in the
English language are derived from the scholastic Latin. The clearness
of meaning which they possess is due to the subtleties, the distinctions,
and the refinements which the schoolmen have crystallized .... ," 29
But, through Francis Bacon's misunderstanding of the schoolmen's
interpretation of Aristotle, we received from them indirectly the con-
fusing concept of "proximate cause" which has befogged our treatment
of negligence."0
Jhering and Holmes
Other borrowings from civilians deserve consideration-for in-
stance, Holmes' borrowing from Jhering. In Holmes' great book
The Common Law, published in 1881, he expressed some startling
ideas which have affected much American legal thinking and, indirectly
at least, many American decisions in recent decades. Holmes, in his
book, several times cited Jhering's Spirit of the Roman Law, but he
never cited those portions of Jhering's work in which I think the
25. So I said in an opinion in 1943. Usatorre v. The Victoria, 172 F.2d 434, 441
(2d Cir. 1949). I had the backing, inter alla, of FRIEDMANN, LEGAL THEORY 294
(1944). But Nussbaum claimed I had erred. Nussbaum, Proving the Law of Foreign
Countries, 3 Am. J. Comp. L. 60, 64 n.19 (1954). However, the one book he cites seems
to support me. See WILLIAMS, THE SOURCES oF LAW IN THE SWISS CIVIL CODE 73
(1923).
26. CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 140 (1921).
27. State Tax Commission v. Aldrich, 316 U.S. 174, 185, 202 n.23 (1942).
28. See Address by Judge L. Hand, Columbia Broadcasting System, May 14,
1933, published in HAND, THE SPIRIT OF LIBETY 103 (1952).
29. Green, Proximate and Remote Cause, 4 Am_. L. REv. 201, 208 (1870), re-
printed in GREEN, ESSAYS ON TORT AND CRIME 1, 9 (1933) and in Frank, A Conflict
With Oblivion: Some Observations on the Pounders of Legal Pragmatism, 9 RUTGERS
L. REv. 425, 452, 458 (1955).
30. See Green, supra note 29.
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latter anticipated Holmes. I mean Jhering's discussion of the inter-
pretative methods of the Roman lawyers.
Jhering wrote of the way the ancient Roman jurisprudence bent
"the rules of logic" and, as "a matter of policy," by a "silent con-
spiracy" would "twist and turn" the literal language in order to meet
"practical interests," the "needs of practical life," the interests and
needs of the time, whenever the "law" became "out of date." He said
that, "though professing to be merely explanations," their interpreta-
tions, "in fact, were a change and development in accordance with the
spirit of the time"; that, "with all their reverence for the letter" of
the "law," they "had too sound a sense to sacrifice to it their own
convictions and practical interests"; that they sought to "adapt" the
letter "to the wants of life"; that these adaptations were "justifiable,
even necessary," and that "the impulse to this . . . corruption [of
the texts] proceeded not from them but from the people." 81
Now turn to Holmes' book: he wrote: "The life of the law has
not been logic: it has been experience. The felt necessities of the time,
the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy,
avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with
their fellow-men, have had a good deal more to do than the syllogism
in determining the rules by which men should be governed. . . . A
very common phenomenon, and one very familiar to the student of
history, is this. The customs, beliefs, or needs of a primitive time es-
tablish a rule or a formula. In the course of centuries the custom,
belief, or necessity disappears, but the rule remains. The reason which
gave rise to the rule has been forgotten, and ingenious minds set them-
selves to inquire how it is to be accounted for. Some ground of
policy is thought of, which seems to explain it and to reconcile it with
the present state of things; and then the rule adapts itself to the new
reasons which have been found for it, and enters on a new career.
The old form receives a new content, and in time even the form mod-
ifies itself to fit the meaning which it has received. . . . And as the
law is administered by able and experienced men, who"-note here
especially the echoes of Jhering-"know too much to sacrifice good
sense to a syllogism, it will be found that, when ancient rules maintain
themselves . . . new reasons more fitted to the time have been found
for them, and that they gradually receive a new content, and at last
a new form, from the grounds to which they have been transplanted." 82
31. My knowledge of German is too inadequate to permit my reading Jhering's
book of which there is no complete translation. The portion of the book to which I
refer will be found translated by Hammond in an appendix to LIaa, HEaMENEUTICS
262-75 (3d ed. 1880).
32. HOLMES, THE CommoN LAw 1, 5, 36 (1881).
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I don't mean at all to imply that Holmes plagiarized.' Jhering's
influence, however, seems undeniable. We may conclude that his
reflections on Roman legal techniques fructified American legal thinking.
Legislative History
In interpreting a statute, the civilians have long resorted to what
we call its "legislative history." The English courts have refused
to accept that technique, perhaps because of the English legislative
practice. Driedger writes that "the work of the draftsman is sub-
stantially completed by the time Parliament first sees the legislation.
It is for this reason, perhaps, that . . . in England, a rather dim
view is taken of the suggestion that legislative history should be ad-
mitted in evidence to show the intent of or to explain statutes. Legis-
lative history- that is to say, an account of the circumstances and
considerations that gave rise to the measure, and of how it took shape
-- does not exist as a matter of record. If it exists at all, it exists in
a multitude of confidential government files, unrecorded Cabinet dis-
cussions, telephone conversations and conferences, and faded recol-
lections of the draftsman's cogitations." 34
In the United States, where the legislative process is different, the
courts now do consider a statute's pre-natal history. Some of our
judges have reacted rather violently to this practice. These judges
have their counterpart in the American literary critics who invented
the so-called "new criticism." These "new critics" were outraged by
those who were more interested in a poet's love affairs-or any other
aspects of his history-than in his poems. The less balanced among
these "new critics" have demanded that one look at the text alone,
never any part of the context. Of course they went too far; text should
never be separated from context. But the lawyer-contextualists have
also gone too far, so far that our court has had to warn that it is not
established doctrine that judges will not look at the language of a
statute unless its legislative history is ambiguous. 5
Strangely enough, those possessed by context-phobia-who believe
judicial investigation of a statute's history leads to judicial "sub-
jectivity"-fail to see that, on the contrary, the rejection of that history
as a clue to legislative purpose may give the judges a wider discretion
-may invite their "subjective" interpretations-since the legislative
history usually narrows the possible scope of the legislative purpose.
33. See Frank, supra note 29, at 436, 440.
34. Driedger, The Legislative Process in Canada, 41 A.B.A.J. 169, 171 (1955).
35. Marks v. Higgins, 213 F.2d 884, 887-88 (2d Cir. 1954).
19561
894 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 104
Perhaps here our courts can learn from studying the methods of the
civilians.3
Equity
The extent of the influence of civil law on our equity has been
much disputed. Yet no one doubts that, to the civilians, English equity
owed much by way of the Romanized canonists, since the early English
chancellors were learned churchmen. (Bentham, I think it was who
said that English equity had been imported on ecclesiastical bottoms.)
Later, St. Germain's early sixteenth century Doctor and Student, in-
fluenced by Gerson, a continental canonist, affected English equity
thinking. Thus, via Aquinas and others, Aristotle's ideas about equity
came down to us.
3 7
Some writers say the Aristotelian influence in this respect related
exclusively to his views of statutory interpretation, not to the equity
powers of the chancery court. I incline to agree with those who crit-
icize that view, who believe that there entered into English chancery
decisions Aristotle's ideas that equity should individualize decisions
and that "equity bids us to be merciful to the weakness of human
nature." "Mercy" was a key word in early English equity, and "in-
dividualization" still remains the guiding spirit in many English and
American equity decisions.3
In England, however, because of its peculiar legal development
after a period when the common-law judges granted equitable relief,
equity came to be administered by separate courts. Some American and
English lawyers regard the difference between the Anglo-American and
civilian administration of equity as unfortunate and hope, by means
of the fusion or merger of "law" and "equity," to eliminate it. But
Pekelis, an emigrant civilian, wrote in 1943: "If someone were com-
pelled to explain the essence of civil law to a common lawyer in one
sentence, he could perhaps say that civil law is what common law would
have been if it had never known a court of chancery. . . . The pic-
ture of conflicting and coexisting jurisdictions is . . . inconceivable
to a Latin or even a German lawyer, who believes in . . . the un-
compromising and sometimes cruel unity of the legal order." 9 Law-
36. See Silving, A Plea for a Law of Interpretation, 98 U. PA. L. Rxv. 499, 508
(1950).
37. See Vinogradoff, Reason and Conscience in Sixteenth Century Jurisprudence,
24 L.Q. Rxv. 373 (1908). For an excellent, brief discussion, citing the authorities,
see Lt Vy-ULLMANN, THE ENGLISH LEGAL TRADITION 287, 305-13 (1935).
38. But see Coing, English Equity and the Denunciatio Evangelica of the Canon
Law, 71 L.Q. REv. 223 (1955), for a suggested different derivation.
39. Pekelis, Legal Techniques and Ideologies, 41 MicH. L. REv. 665 (1943), re-
printed in PECLIs, LAW AND SocIAL AcTION 42, 72 (1950). Earlier Pound had
declared that, on account of the fusion statutes, there was a "decadence of equity"
in late 19th century America. Pound, The Decadence of Equity, 5 COLUM. L. Ray.
20, 29 (1905).
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son, in 1951, said of the English system: "We should not have many
of the most characteristic and valuable portions .of our law, had we
not had an equity systematically developed in separate courts." 40 He
noted "an equitable jurisdiction based on.a good faith introduced" on
the Continent "six or seven hundred years after it was introduced in
England." 41 However, Rheinstein reports that in Germany, as late
as shortly after World War I, the "good faith" ("treu und glauben")
provision of the code was regarded with such distrust that a lawyer
who cited it was guilty of "bad taste." 42 In the area of equity,
then, it would seem that the Anglo-American, by something of an
historical fluke or accident, improved upon the civilian methods.
43
I heartily endorse the fusion, procedurally, of "law" and "equity."
But "substantive equity," I think, should never be forgotten. And
the retention of the word "equity" I deem important. It instills in
the judge a different mood, one of elasticity and fairness. Nothing
is more absurd than the saying: "A rose by any other name is just
as sweet." If the rose were called the "bloody-nose flower," it might
well be odious.
Oral Testimony
One marked disservice of the civilians to our equity procedure
was that the English chancellors apparently took over from the sum-
mary procedure of the canon law 44 the practice of receiving written
testimony only.45 Legal historians have long maintained that the
presence of the jury explained why the English common-law trial
courts, as distinguished from the equity courts, received oral testimony.
But Ullmann recently showed us that, on the Continent, the fourteenth
century postglossators who, as civilian judges or advocates ".
40. LAwsoN, THE RATIONAL STRENGTH OF ENGLISH LAW 32 (1951).
41. Id. at 33.
42. Rheinstein, The Struggle Between Equity and Stability in the Law of Post-
War Germany, 3 U. PiTt. L. REv. 91, 99 (1936).
43. In several of our leading university law schools, there is now no course on
"equity." I teach a course on the subject at Yale Law School, but until June 1956,
I have been required to call it "Procedure III." One of my esteemed colleagues,
Judge Charles Clark, has been a leader in this sort of eradication of the word "equity"
from the law school curriculum, rejecting it almost as if it were an obscene term.
Yet I note that, in several of his opinions, he felt it made a difference to call a court
of bankruptcy a "court of equity." City of New York v. Rassner, 127 F.2d 703, 706
(2d Cir. 1942); Kroell v. New York Ambassador, Inc., 108 F.2d 294, 295 (2d Cir.
1939); In re United States Realty & Improvement Co., 108 F.2d 794, 799-800 (2d
Cir. 1940) (dissenting opinion).
44. But see Coing, supra note 38.
45. In the federal courts in this country, we retained that unfortunate practice,
except for a short period from 1789 to 1802, until 1912. It meant that in equity
cases, the trial judge, the "finder" of facts, could not observe the demeanor of the
witnesses.
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had their eyes fixed upon the practical administration of the law," main-
tained that the ". . indispensable requisite for the judge to form
his opinion on the trustworthiness of witnesses was that they appeared
before him personally. . . . The personal impressions made upon the
judge by the witnesses, their way of answering questions, their reac-
tions and behavior in Court, were the only means of ascertaining
whether their statements were trustworthy or not. . . . It was
thought necessary, therefore, that the judge . . . should put on
record in the files any specific reactions, e.g., that the witness stam-
mered, hesitated in replying to a specific question, or showed fear during
)) 48the interrogation. . . o
Some writers assert that after a long period in which the continen-
tal courts in civil cases abandoned the use of oral testimony, the
courts, in lands not dominated by French influence, e.g., Germany,
today rely primarily on oral testimony.47 Yet one wonders whether
they do so in practice. Cejka, a German exchange student at Yale
Law School, writing in 1951 of his experience in Germany as an as-
sistant to a judge, reported that the German judges actually based
their decisions on the written testimony as recorded in the lawyers'
briefs. 48 If that is true, then current German and American practices
differ greatly.
The preceding instances are illustrative examples of both favorable
and unfavorable influences of the civil law on the common law. The
process doubtlessly will continue, but the services may be enhanced
and the ills decreased by sympathetic studies of comparative law.
LITIGATION AND COMPARATIVE LAW
However, at this point I am referring to litigation, not to what
Ehrlich and many other members of the "sociological" school call the
"living law," i.e., the out-of-court regularities, the mores, the smooth-
running social norms which, embodying socially accepted policies and
ideals, serve to keep society going. The "living law" of course has vast
importance. It is the creation of an international "living law" to which,
in large part, we must look for the development of a world community.
But it is precisely when, in particular instances, those smooth-
running mores break down that litigation breaks out. Doubtless those
46. Ullmann, Medieval Principles of Evidence, 62 L.Q. Rxv. 77, 83-84 (1946);
see also ULLMANN, THE MEDrEvA. IDEA OF LAW 124-25 (1946); NLRB v. Dinion
Coil Co., 201 F.2d 484, 488 (2d Cir. 1952). Warning: See point II of the Appendix
for value and dangers of "demeanor evidence."
47. See, e.g., SCHLESINGER, COMPARATIVE LAW 213 (1950).
48. As to Latin countries, see Pekelis, sipra note 39.
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social norms and the legal rules, statutory or common-law, interact
and influence one another reciprocally. The investigation of those in-
teractions should be the task of lawyers who are also cultural anthro-
pologists, but to date that task is undischarged.49 We still remain
largely ignorant, far more so than most of Ehrlich's ardent disciples
will admit, of those reciprocal influences even within any country.
For this reason alone, it is therefore by no means easy to engage in
"functional comparisons" of legal systems.O
You need not be reminded that, in every legal system, the substan-
tive legal rules do not guarantee the results of litigation. But, in addi-
tion to the often leaky character of those rules, there are other phases of
litigation which cause even greater uncertainty. Surely the effects of
different modes of trial in different countries should be of much in-
terest to all students of "comparative law." Yet some such students
incline to cold-shoulder that subject, to be irritated by those of us
who insist on the significance of the practical results of the trial process
in particular cases. Thus, Kunz calls us "nihilistic," and asserts ab-
surdly, probably to avoid the embarrassment to him of considering
such matters, that we believe there are "no general rules or principles
of law." "
Certainly, no one can reasonably deny that the mode of trial in
vogue in a given country at any particular time seriously affects the
manner in which its substantive legal rules work. A substantive legal
rule may seem to remain the same but practically does not, in terms of
results, if trial is by ordeal, or by compurgation, or if evidence is
T'weighed" according to the old strict rules of proof, or admitted ac-
cording to more liberal rules, or if trial is by jury. Wise students of
a foreign legal system, therefore, will not study its substantive rules
only; they will study also its procedural rules to see how they affect
the substantive ones. Think for instance of rules in respect to burden
of proof. Such a procedural rule may completely sterilize a substan-
tive rule. Thus, so Kenny says, at one time under canon law no
cardinal could be convicted of incontinence except on the evidence of
seven eye-witnesses. 2  Think, too, of the restrictions in some civil
49. See FRANK, CoURTs ON TRIAL 291, 342-43 (1949); Frank, The Lawyer's
Role in Modern Society, 4 J. PuB. L. 8, 15-18 (1955).
50. Rheinstein, Teaching Comparative Law, 5 U. CHrI. L. REv. 615, 617-18
(1938).
51. Kunz, The American Science of International Law in 2 LAw: A CENTURY
OF PRoGREss 166, 188 (Reppy ed. 1937) ; cf. Campbell, Book Review, 17 MODERN L.
REv. 174, 176-77 (1954).
52. KENNY, CRimrNAL LAwYER 456 (1936). Aquinas said: "A bishop shall not
be condemned save on the evidence of seventy-two witnesses. .. ."
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law countries on (a) the right of a party to testify in a civil suit and
(b) the power of the court to compel him to testify.
Judicial Fact Finding
However, procedure does not consist exclusively of procedural
rules. To illustrate what I have in mind, I ask you first to consider
the Roman praetor and the judex. The praetor told the judex what
legal rules he must apply to the case; but the judex received the evi-
dence. The judex, it is said, rendered his decision by logically applying
those rules to the facts as he ascertained them from the evidence.
Many rules and principles of Roman law on which much modem civil
law still rests are found in the praetor's statements or in the responsa of
the jurisconsults, but we know next to nothing of the way the judex
"found" the facts in particular cases. Now unless we know that, I
submit that we know very little of how Roman law actually worked
in litigated cases.
Every legal rule includes an "if," for a legal rule is an "if-then"
statement. The rule says: "If the facts are such-and-such, then this
rule applies, i.e., this legal consequence follows." For example, "If
a man kills another without provocation, he will be punished." Or,
"If a trustee, for his owii purposes, uses trust finds, he must account
for his profits to the beneficiary." The "if" clause must be filled in by
the kind of facts designated in the rule. Those facts, to which a court
applies the rule, are necessarily past facts, events which occurred
before the law suit began. The court cannot observe them, see or hear
them. They do not walk into the courtroom. The trial court, acting
as an historian, must seek to reconstruct those past events as best
it can.' When the trial court "finds" the facts, they are obviously not
the "objective" past facts as they actually happened. The facts, as
one of the ingredients of a court's decision, are nothing but what the
court determines them to be.
My approach here, as elsewhere, is "constructive legal scepti-
cism.'54 Without such an approach, understanding and intelligent im-
provement of any legal system is, I think, impossible. My discussion
of fact-finding rests on what I call "fact-scepticism," 55 which rep-
53. That the judicial fact-finder functions as an historian and encounters many
of the difficulties of the ordinary (non-judicial) historian, see FRANK, COURTS ON
TRiAL. 37-40, 155-56 (1949); In re Fried, 161 F.2d 453, 462 n.21 (2d Cir. 1947);
cf. FRANK, FATE AND FREOEm passim (1945).
54. See FRANK, COURTs ON TRiAL passim (1949).
55. See id. at 73-77; FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND viii-xiv (1930);
Frank, A Conflict With Oblivion: Some Observations on the Founders of Legal
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resents but one of two basic segments of such constructive scepticism.
The other segment is "rule scepticism," the awareness that formal
legal rules produce much less legal certainty than orthodox theorists
admit. 6 Both segments are essential, but "fact-scepticism" has been
largely neglected by legal thinkers in general and by students of "com-
parative law" in particular.
It should not be ignored that judicial fact determination may well
not match the actual facts. Why? Because the court arrived at its
"finding" of facts by its reaction to the stories told by the witnesses
who are often fallible (1) in their original observations of the fact
when it occurred, (2) in their memories of their initial observations,
and (3) in their accounts, their testimonies of those memories. So
the testimony of the witnesses is permeated with subjectivity. The
judge, as "finder" of the facts, is also humanly fallible. His "finding"
stems from his fallible, subjective reactions to the testimony. Those
reactions derive from all the elements of his personality, which includes
not only his cultural background, his economic, social and political
attitudes, but also his many hidden, inscrutable idiosyncrasies, his un-
conscious biases for or against witnesses-for example, a plus or minus
reaction to women, unmarried women, red-haired or brunette men,
fidgety men, Catholics, Jews, Poles or Irishmen. His "findings" of
fact result, then, from his subjective reactions to the subjective re-
actions of the witnesses to the actual facts they purport to have ob-
served.57  His fact-finding involves a double, or multiple, subjectivity,
and the facts as he determines them, accordingly, may easily be mis-
taken. They are not "objective" but "subjective" facts.
58
The facts as "found" in a particular case are not "data" (i.e.,
given). They are not something "out there" which the court looks for
Pragnmatism, 9 RUTGERS L. REv. 425, 446-48 (1954); Frank, "Short of Sickness and
Death": A Study of Moral Responsibility it Legal Criticis , 26 N.Y.U.L. Rxv. 545
(1951). See also Frank, Are Judges Human?, 80 U. PA. L. REv. 17, 32-37, 47-49,
233-39, 251 (1931); Frank, What Courts Do In Fact, 26 ILL. L. REv. 645, 650-51
(1932).
56. As to "rule scepticism," see FiRNI1, COURTS ON TRIAL 275-88 (1949);
FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 148-59 (1930); Llewellyn, On Reading and
Using the New Jurisprudence, 26 A.B.A.J. 418 (1940); Llewellyn, The Rule of Law
in Our Case-Law of Contract, 47 YALE L.J. 1243 (1938); Llewellyn, A Realistic
Jurisprudence-The Next Step, 30 CoLUiM. L. REv. 431 (1930).
57. See ENGELmANN, HISTORY OF CONTINENTAL CIVIL PROCEDURE 609 (1927), to
the effect that, in modern German procedure, ". . . the degree of force to be at-
tached to the several means of proof is controlled solely by the subjective conviction
of the court." (Emphasis added.)
58. The situation is even more complicated, since the "facts," as the judge reports
them, may sometimes not even represent what he believes them to be. See Frank,
"Short of Sickness and Death": A Study of Moral Responsibility in Legal Criticism,
26 N.Y.U.L. REv. 545, 583 (1951).
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and actually finds. Instead, they are something made by the particular
judge or judges sitting in the particular case, and are therefore imper-
fect, man-made, all-too-human products. 9 What the particular trial
judge thus "finds" in a particular case may not at all be what another
trial judge would have "found" if sitting in that same case, for trial
judges in fact "finding" are not fungible in their reactions to the wit-
nesses.
You'll now begin to see, I trust, why fact "finding" plays hob
with "comparative law." If, within any legal system, the "facts,"
and therefore the decisions which result from applying the legal rules
to those "facts," vary with the particular trial court, we cannot com-
pare the operation of the rules within that system with the operation
of the rules within another legal system. Let me now explore this
problem more intensively.
"Fact-Discretion' and the "Unruly"
In almost any advanced legal system, the fact-finder, when the
witnesses flatly disagree with one another, as they usually do, has an
immense discretion. That is, he must choose what part of the con-
flicting testimony is to be taken as reliable, as revealing the actual past
facts in controversy. Only a few American courts have labeled as
"discretion" that power of choice, but discretion it is. Interestingly
enough, when the continental countries abandoned the old strict rules
of proof, civilian writers openly said that the trial judge now exercised
"discretion" in fact finding.
That "discretion-that fact-selection power--can be little con-
trolled externally. No rules concerning its exercise have ever been or
can ever be formulated; 'o it is therefore "unruly." " Because of this
unruly selective power, Tourtoulon speaks of the "sovereignty" of the
trial court.
This means what? It means that the fact ingredient of a decision,
the "if" in the "if-then" which every legal rule contains, is a product
of a virtually uncontrollable discretion, whenever the testimony is in
conflict-as it usually is. 2  It follows that, usually, any legal rule, no
59. Warning: The sort of facts here discussed are not the "background" facts,
such as social or economic facts-of the kind presented in "Brandeis briefs." Such
"background" facts are sometimes more objective than those I discuss in the text.
But even this objectivity is often an illusion. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 210-12
(1949) ; Frank, The Lawyer's Role in Modern Society, 4 3. PUB. L. 8, 12 (1955).
60. See NLRB v. Dinion Coil Co., 201 F.2d 484, 488-90 (2d Cir. 1952); cf.
MAINE, VILLAGE COMM NiTiEs 317-18 (3d ed. 1889).
61. See Frank, "Short of Sickness and Death": A Study of Moral Responsibility
in Legal Criticism, 26 N.Y.U.L. Ray. 545, 561-64 (1951).
62. See, e.g., NLRB v. Dinion Coil Co., 201 F.2d 484, 488-90 (2d Cir. 1952).
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matter how precisely worded, how inflexible it may seem, confers on
the judicial fact-finder a huge discretionary power.
Was the judex, the ancient Roman fact-finder, in a markedly dif-
ferent position? I think not.6 I ask, then, whether the judex did not
possess an immense but concealed discretion. If so, the real working
of the Roman legal system cannot be discovered solely in its rules and
principles, procedural or substantive. To study them alone is to obtain
an illusory notion of Roman "law." "
Fact Discretion and Interpretation of Legal Rules
Consider, then, the role in litigation of statutes which embody
social norms, policies, ideals. It is commonplace that in law suits a
statute gets its interpretation through its application or non-application.
If, when a statute is invoked in a law suit, the court refuses to apply
it, the court interprets the statute pro tanto by holding it inapplicable.
So a court nullifies a statute whenever the court so misfinds the actual
objective facts that it fails to apply the statute to the facts to which it
was intended to apply; for a statute is not applied as intended, either
when applied to non-existent facts or when a court, mistakenly or
otherwise, denies its application to the actual objective facts of the
case.
The prize illustration is the nullification of the American liquor
prohibition act by deliberate misfindings of the actual facts. But
daily in our courts, we witness such nullifying interpretations of nu-
merous other statutes by erroneous fact-findings, whether inadvertent
or deliberate. The decisions that result from such misfindings of
fact will seldom be reversed on appeal, because when the testimony
is conflicting, as is ordinarily the case, the fact-discretion exercised in
thus finding the facts is usually not open to criticism by an upper court
or by anyone else.'
Wigmore, Pound and others have lauded the jury system because
juries can and do prevent the enforcement of socially undesirable legal
rules through misfindings of fact, misfindings concealed by the general
63. Radin says the judex relied on "his own common sense and experience"
for his determination of the facts.
Probably the judex did not receive oral testimony. But, absent an appeal, it
would seem that his fact-determinations became conclusive.
64. I have put this problem to Jolowicz and to Yntema. I have received no
satisfactory reply.
65. See, e.g., Colby v. Klune, 178 F.2d 872, 874-75 (2d Cir. 1949); Broadcast
Music, Inc. v. Havana Madrid Restaurant Corp., 175 F.Zd 77, 80 (2d Cir. 1949);
Watt v. Thomas, [1947] A.C. 481; Powell v. Streatham Manor [1935] A.C. 243.
Warning: See point I of Appendix to this paper for qualifications of the state-
ment in the text.
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verdict. I am sceptical about the virtue of that method, i.e., about the
capacities of juries to pick out and kill off undesirable statutes; and
for reasons I won't here stop to state, I happen to believe that neither
that nor any other argument for the jury system justifies it.6" But in
making their particular argument, Wigmore and Pound have strikingly
disclosed that juries, via their largely unreviewable fact-discretion,
every day interpret statutes contrary to the legislature's clearest intent.
However, that method of interpretation is not confined to juries.
Trial judges sitting without juries also frequently employ it, con-
sciously or, more often, unconsciously. They, and juries, do so too
in respect of non-statutory legal rules.
We speak, customarily, of the "application of a legal rule to the
facts." However, once we recognize that the facts as "found" often
result in part from the hidden biases of the fact "finder" with respect
to the witnesses, and that those hidden biases often affect the decision
of a particular case fully as much as does the legal rule, we should not
single out the legal rule as the only thing the court "applies," for often
the rule represents but one of the decision's crucial ingredients. Since
those biases also frequently represent crucial ingredients, in order to
be descriptively accurate we should speak also of the "application"
of the court's unknowable biases.
The Supreme Court, by Justice Frankfurter, has declared that,
in a diversity of citizenship case, ". . . the outcome of the litigation
in the federal court should be substantially the same, so far as legal
rules determine the outcome of a litigation, as it would be if tried
in a State Court." 6 Please note the crucial qualification in the phrase
so far as legal rules determine the outcome of a litigation.
. Significantly, the same Justice in later cases said that, "...
no finder of fact can see through the eyes of any other finder of fact," IS
and that there may be a "diversity in result" in the trials of different
cases for "similar conduct" charged as violative of the same statute.69
This is but another way of saying that the legal rules do not suffice to
determine the outcome of litigation, and that the "unruly" elements
leave future decisions uncertain and unpredictable.7" Studies of stat-
66. See, e.g., FRANx, COURTS ON TRiAL 108-45 (1949); FRANK, LAW AND TK E
MODERN MnND 170-85, 203-09 (1930).
67. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945). (Emphasis added.)
68. Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733, 753 (1949) (concurring opinion).
69. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 535 (1948) (dissenting opinion). See
also Huilever v. The Otho, 139 F.2d 748, 750 (2d Cir. 1944).
70. See Frank, "Short of Sickness and Death': A Study of Moral Respoiz-
sibility in Legal Criticism, 26 N.Y.U.L. REv. 545, 626 (1951) : "Let us take stock.
The following striking features emerge from our survey of trials: (1) Witnesses do
not uniformly react to the past events about which they testify. (2) In most trials,
the witnesses orally tell conflicting stories to the trial court concerning those events.
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utory interpretation, or of the operation of non-statutory rules and
principles, use a scissors minus one blade when they disregard the
element of fact-discretion in court-house fact-finding. Consequently,
"comparative law" will be sterile so long as it ignores fact-discretion.
ILLUSORY IDENTITIES RESULT FROM IGNORING THE NATURE OF THE
"FACT-FINDIN G" PROCESS
Schwartz, an able student of "comparative law," is typical of
many of his kind in stressing, as the chief value of that subject, the
discovery of basic similarities among divers legal systems, similarities
which are obscured by seeming or surface differences.7 He expressed
that idea in an excellent review of a brilliant book, Lloyd's Public
Policy.72 Lloyd, comparing the application of the public policy concept
by French and English courts, repeatedly refers to ". . . similar
solutions arrived at by what may seem superficially to be differing or
even conflicting premises or methods of approach." 71
These are valuable insights, but the emphasis on such identities
can be overdone and can lead to erroneous conclusions. Are the "solu-
tions" involved in two decisions, one in France and one in the United
States, to be deemed substantially the same merely because, in ap-
parently solving in substantially the same way what appears to be the
same problem, the two courts stated the same facts--despite important
differences in the method of trial, i.e., the methods of "proving" the
facts? One must ask: did substantially the same evidence come before
the two courts? If not, can it properly be said that, had the French
(3) In any such case, for decision purposes, what we call the 'facts' of a case, derives,
at best, from the trial judge's . . . belief as to the reliability of the stories told by
some, rather than others, of the disagreeing witfiesses. (4) There* are few uni-
formities. in the formation of those beliefs of trial judges . . ., and no rules to aid
them in forming those beliefs. (5) Those beliefs determine the fate of most litigants
because, in the very few cases that are appealed, the upper courts usually accept the
trial court's beliefs, since those beliefs involve trial-court 'fact-discretion' with which
the upper courts seldom interfere. (6) To make matters more complicated, those
beliefs are often but purported beliefs. . . . (7) Moreover, the beliefs, real or
purported, are often not reported to anyone. If such a trial-court belief is not re-
ported, and if the trial court's decision is appealed, usually the upper court will fic-
tionally assume that the trial court had a belief, based on some selected part of the
conflicting oral testimony, which will justify the trial court's decision.
"If you put together all these items, you must conclude that those who glibly talk
of predicting future decisions, in cases as yet untried, have grossly exaggerated litiga-
tion-certainty."
See also FRANK, CouRTs ON TRiAL passim (1949); Frank, A Conflict With
Oblizvio: Sonw Observations on the Founders of Legal CriticisM, 9 RUTGERS L. RPv.
425, 446-50 (1954) ; Frank, Modern and Ancient Legal Pragmnatisin--ohn Dewey &
Co. vs. Aristotle, 25 NoTm DAmE LAw. 207, 460 (1950); Frank, Book Review, 13
LAw & CoNTEmP. PROB. 369 (1948).
71. See Schwartz, Book Review, 7 J. LEGAL ED. 460, 461 (1955).
,72. LLOYD, PUBLIC PoLicy (1953).
73. Id. at xiii. See also id. at 96, 151.
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case been tried in the American court, the same facts would have been
"found"? If substantially different facts would have been "found"
in the American court, then the two "solutions" are not substantially
similar in any real sense. The asserted identity turns on the apparent
identity of the facts, but the apparently identical facts are not the actual,
objective facts but only the facts as "found" in the two courts. Shall
no significance attach to the effect of pre-trial discovery in the American
court and to the refusal of the French court to permit such discovery? 4
Does it not make a vital difference that in the one system there is
almost exclusive reliance on written evidence, while in the other much
oral testimony is received? In a civil trial, in some civil law countries,
several judges sit, but only one of them sees and hears the witnesses;
he reports to the other judges.75 In such a case, Kahn-Freund sug-
gests, there are ". . . not two sources of error but three: between
the facts testified and the decision of the court, there stand the wit-
ness, the reporting judge and the court appraising the reporting
judge." Does not this difference from our method of trial affect the
result? And think of the differences in that most important factor,
the means of enforcing judgments.76
Lloyd, Schwartz and Co. have dug one layer below the surface
differences to uncover seemingly basic similarities, similar "real rules"
below the "paper rules." 77 Their digging stopped too soon; one layer
deeper they would have come upon more fundamental differences
covered up by the layer of similarities.
My point is that too many "comparative law" students disregard
the trial process. Lloyd, for a moment, puts his finger on this point
in a footnote when he says that the "basic uncertainty of the legal
process . . . as to facts . . . is more apt to impress itself on the
practitioner than the academic lawyer 7 -- also, I would add, on the
trial lawyer as differentiated from the office lawyer and the appellate
court lawyer. The many unruly factors in trials, mightily affecting
the decisions, are likely to escape the office lawyer and appellate court
lawyer as well as the academe. Many of them are still enthralled, more
or less, by some form of the myth of legal certainty. Even when, like
Lloyd, they are keenly aware of the legal uncertainty occasioned by
74. See, e.g., SCHLESINGER, COMPARATIE LAW 208-09 (1950).
75. See, e.g., Hanmmelmann, Rules of Evidence Under the New Italian Civil Codes,
29 J. ComP. LE. & INTL L. (3d ser.) 39, 46 (1947) ; Sereni, Basic Features of Civil
Procedure in Italy, 1 Am. J. CoMP. L. 373, 380-84 (1952).
76. See, e.g., Pekelis, Legal Techniques and Political Ideologies, 41 MICH. L. REv.
665, 667-77 (1943).
77. In this respect, they resemble Llewellyn. See his writings cited in note 56
sup7.
78. LLoYD, op. cit. supra note 72, at 118 nA4
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the uncertainties inhering in the formal legal rules and principles, they
largely overlook the far greater uncertainties inhering in trial-court
fact determinations. Only thus can one understand why so singularly
keen a scholar as Rheinstein writes: "The problems which courts have
to decide are essentially the same on both sides of the Atlantic, and I
venture to say, eighty percent or even more of the solutions are the
same." 7' These thinkers have attained "rule scepticism"-but have
not yet advanced to "fact scepticism."
I must at once acknowledge that some "comparative law" scholars
are not thus guilty; for example, Schlesinger, who points out the prac-
tical effects of procedural differences.80 Dean Griswold of Harvard
Law School discloses awareness of the problem but says that, in the
"comparative law" courses at Harvard, little time is devoted to the
"procedure and practice" of any foreign country because it is ".
very difficult, without extensive, practical experience in the [foreign]
jurisdiction, to have an accurate idea of the law in action" there.8'
McDougal's invaluable discussions of "comparative law" come
close, sometimes, to my approach; they underscore the many variables
in decision-making, and include among those variables the idiosyncratic
reactions of the particular judge who decides a particular case. 2 Yet
McDougal seems to offset this insight by dwelling on the "flow of de-
cisions," I as if that "flow" could be understood without a thorough
knowledge of the hidden variables, especially in "finding" the facts,
involved in each particular decision.
By that respect, he somewhat resembles Felix Cohen who centers
on the "path of precedents" and maintains that this "path" can be
predicted with considerable accuracy.84 In seeking to predict the
course of future decisions, Cohen relies on the uniformity of the "social
forces" operative at any given time and place as the prime pre-
diction-instrument. McDougal, for his purposes, relies far less on
79. Rheinstein, Common and Civil Law-A Comparison, 12 PA. B.A.Q. 7, 19
(1940).
80. See SCHLESiNGER, CoMPARATmvE LAW (1950). He includes in this book,
at 197-201, the valuable article by Amos, A Day in Court at Home and Abroad,
2 CAm. L.J. 340 (1926), and an excellent brief discussion of the effects of differences
in procedure, id. at 220-22.
81. Re, Comparative Law Courses in the Law School Curriculum, 1 Am. J.
ComP. L. 233, 239 (1952).
82. See McDougal, The Comparative Study of Law for Policy Purposes: Value
Clarification as an Instrument of Democratic World Order, 61 YALE L.J. 915, 922
(1952).
83. Id. at 920-21.
84. See citations of Cohen's writings in Frank, "Short of Sickness and Death":
A Study of Moral Responsibilities in Legal Criticism, 26 N.Y.U.L. Rv. 545 passim
(1951).
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such "forces." " Nevertheless, McDougal's effort to detect the "flow
of decisions" and Cohen's to predict the "path of precedents" en-
counter the same obstacle, i.e., the undiscoverable, unruly, aspects of
"fact-finding" in particular cases.
McDougal, after reading these comments, tells me that his posi-
tion depends on the facts as seen by a "disinterested observer." He
has written: "Thus we can hope to predict the probable responses of
courts . . . to probable kinds of objective situations"; and he has
defined "objective facts" in a law suit as the facts as they would look to
"an objective, non-participant observer who utilizes all available
sources.. " 86 But, this side of deity, there exists no such ob-
server of the actual facts of cases.
The ordeals, invoking magic or deity, sought a "disinterested ob-
server." 87 McDougal has not pointed to any adequate modem sub-
stitute. True, he discusses not only court decisions but also those made
by other men. My immediate criticism relates solely to his discussion
of the former, but I surmise that there are never any disinterested
human observers of the "objective" facts on which any kind of man-
made decisions turn.
I can't here further enlarge on what I regard as McDougal's fail-
ure to observe how far the hidden variables he describes interfere with
a meaningful discovery of the "flow of decisions," 8 or discuss at
length the related flaws in the various theses of those who, like Cohen,
believe that prediction of most future decisions is possible.89  I do
think it worthwhile to quote in part as pertinent what I have said
elsewhere about one weakness in Felix Cohen's thesis: "Cohen im-
plies that the 'social forces,' at any particular time, have a substan-
tially uniform influence on court decisions. Others talk of substan-
tial uniformity in the 'living law' (which rests on customs and mores),
or in the community's sense of justice (or injustice), or in the prev-
alent social moral attitudes or ideals. Disregarding the fact that, in
our society, there are, as to many subjects, many warring customs,
moral attitudes and ideals, let it be assumed, arguendo, that such uni-
85. McDougal, after reading these comments, said in a conversation with me that
his aim was not prediction. But see Lasswell & McDougal, Legal Education and
Public Policy: Professional Training in the Public Interest, 52 YALE L.J. 203, -40
(1943). For McDougal's present emphasis on the purpose of insight and change,
rather than of prediction, he refers me to McDougal, The Comparative Study of Law
for Policy Purposes: Value Clarification as an Instrument of Democratic World
Order, 61 YALE L.J. 915 (1952).
86. Lasswell & McDougal, supra note 85, at 239-40.
87. See FRANK, CoURTs ON TRIAL 37-79 (1949).
88. Id. at 201-06.
89. See Frank, A Conflict With Oblivion: Some Observations on the Founders
of Legal Criticism, 9 RuTcFRs L. REv. 425, 446-49 (1954).
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formities are both dominant and knowable. The argument about the
effect of such uniformities usually takes this form: Countless transac-
tions, it is said, are governed by the 'living law'; these transactions
never develop into law suits, never come before the courts; conse-
quently such transactions are not plagued by the uncertainties and
unpredictabilities encountered in litigation. Litigation (so that argu-
ment goes) represents the unusual, the 'pathological' or 'sick' situations,
when the smooth-running, socially accepted, norms disrupt, and the
unsettled disputes go to the courts, which serve as 'hospitals.' But,
as this argument itself makes plain, the 'living law' does not affect liti-
gation, except to the extent that a demonstrable correlation exists be-
tween (a) the out-of-court regularities and (b) what happens in the
courts when the 'sickness' of litigation breaks out. Let us assume,
however, that a correlation does exist, to a considerable degree, be-
tween the out-of-court regularities and the in-court regularities we
call the legal rules. But then the vital question becomes this: Do (1)
these in-court regularities, the legal rules, usually bring about any-
thing like (2) regularities in court decisions? The answer is no-
because of the vagaries of trial-court fact-finding.
"Assuming now that the out-of-court uniformities are embodied
in the legal rules and reflect community morals or ideals, let us ap-
proach the problem in terms of morals or ideals. It then appears that,
in fact-finding in particular law suits, those uniformities are balked by
private, un-uniform, moral attitudes. I call them 'moral' for this rea-
son: If the unconscious, subthreshold, individual prejudices of par-
ticular trial judges or jurors towards particular witnesses (or lawyers
or litigants) were consciously entertained and publicized, they would
spell out as moral-or immoral or unmoral-attitudes. They would
then be open to criticism, and would perhaps be made to accord with
acceptable community attitudes. But they are concealed, publicly un-
scrutinized, uncommunicated. These secret, unconscious, private,
idiosyncratic, 'moral' norms or standards cut across-they fight with
and nullify-the influence, on fact-findings, of the moral attitudes and
ideals of the community which (we have assumed) are both knowable
and uniform.
"Here is a kind of rampant subjectivity ignored by legal thinkers
. who minimize the difficulties of legal criticism and of prediction
of decisions. These thinkers overlook the distinction between (1) the
more or less 'objective' (uniform) character of the norms embodied
in the legal rules (whether 'paper' or 'real' rules) and (2) the 'sub-
jective' character of the trial judges' or juries' responses to conflict-
ing oral testimony. Why? Because those thinkers are thinking of
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cases in upper courts where the 'facts' are ordinarily those 'found' by
the trial courts." 90
Other Unruly Elements of the Decisional Process
For brevity's sake, in speaking of fact-finding, I have omitted
mention of one of its most important features: the merging of "facts"
and rules in a judge's, or jury's, gestalt or composite reaction. That
element represents a sort of fourth dimension of the decisional proc-
ess. 1 I have also omitted any reference to several other unruly
aspects of fact-finding such as perjury, the prejudices of witnesses,
missing witnesses, missing documents, the skill or ineptitude of the
lawyer representing one or the other of the parties, and the ability or
inability of litigants to meet the expense of obtaining evidence-includ-
ing the hiring of expert accountants, engineers or detectives-often
essential to success in law suits."2 Nonetheless, they are important
elements of "fact-scepticism." '
THE JUSTICE FACTOR
Several writers have urged that, in a conflict of laws case, a court
should always give paramount consideration to doing justice in the
particular case when asked to apply a foreign legal rule."4 I heartily
agree.95 Nor would I confine such an attitude to conflict of laws
cases.9
6
The difficulties encountered in doing justice present difficulties
for "comparative law." This appears from the following: a court
90. See Frank, "Short of Sickness and Death": A Study of Moral Responsibility
in Legal Criticism, 26 N.Y.U.L. REv. 545, 581-82 (1951).
91. See, e.g., PRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL C. 12 (1949); FRANK, LAW AND THE
MODERN MIND 116 (1930) ; Frank, "Short of Sickness and Death": A Study of Moral
Responsibility in Legal Criticism, 26 N.Y.U.L. REv. 545, 595-600 (1951); Frank,
What Courts Do in Fact, 26 ILL. L. REv. 645, 655-56 (1932).
92. See FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 94-99 (1949) ; Frank, White-Collar Justice,
Sat. Eve. Post, July 17, 1943, p. 22; Frank, Book Review, 56 YALE L.J. 589 (1947).
93. I am pleased to note that several distinguished legal thinkers do recognize
the importance of "fact-scepticism." CAHN, THE MORAL DECISION (1955) ; PATTER-
SON, JURISPRUDENCE 187-88, 298, 544-45, 567, 590 (1953); Stone, Book Review,
63 HAv. L. REv. 1466 (1950).
94. See Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HARv. L. REv. 173-
78, 186-87 (1933); Kronstein, Crisis of "Conflict of Laws," 37 GEo. L.J. 483, 484
(1949) ; Morris, The Proper Law of a Tort, 64 HARV. L. REv. 881 (1951) ; cf., Shaw,
Savill, Albion & Co. v. The Fredericksburg, 189 F.2d 952, 956 n.19 (2d Cir. 1951) ;
GRmEN, JUDGE AND JURY 76-77, 97, 151 (1930); Bodenheimer, The Public Policy
Exceptimr,, 12 THE JURIST 51, 63-66 (1954).
As to the tendency of many courts to take many a conflict rule as "... in itself
a jural end," see CARDOzo, PARADOXES OF LEGAL ScIEcE 67-68 (1928).
95. See Siegleman v. Cunard White Star, Ltd., 221 F.2d 188, 206 (2d Cir. 1955)
(dissenting opinion).
96. See FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 35, 90-91, 371, 383, 388-91 (1949).
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cannot do justice in a particular case to the extent that it, for any rea-
son, fails to ascertain the actual facts. Serious inadequacies in the
trial process necessarily yield injustice when they prevent the ascertain-
ment of the actual facts; for the application of a correct rule, a just rule,
to the "wrong" facts, to facts that never happened and therefore to
spurious facts, is as unjust as the application of a "wrong" rule to the
actual facts. Misfinding of the facts may ruin a litigant. Some of
the inadequacies of the trial process which yield such injustices are in-
eradicable because they involve indelible human frailties; 97 others can
be and should be eliminated. 8
It should shock us that, thanks to our trial methods, Judge
Learned Hand, our wisest judge, could remark: ". . . I must say
that as a litigant I should dread a lawsuit beyond almost anything else
short of sickness and death." " The ineradicable defects of trials-
those which stem from the unruly elements in "finding" the facts and
which account for unavoidable uncertainties and injustices-also con-
stitute a stumbling block to "comparative law," for reasons I have
previously suggested.
The Justice Factor and the Upper Court Myth
An upper court can do little to eliminate those inadequacies as
they affect any particular decision on appeal. For reasons already
canvassed, the "facts" are usually those which the trial court "found,"
so that they are data, i.e., already finally "cooked," for the upper court.
Consequently, the upper court cannot correct uncertainties and in-
justices resulting from defects inherent in the accepted trial methods.
The naive belief to the contrary stems from what I call the "upper-
court myth," a myth that upper courts are always or usually the most
important part of the judicial process:1° We cannot, then, look to
upper courts to get rid of those obstacles to "comparative law" which
result from the unruly qualities of trial-court fact-finding.
The Justice Factor and Natural Law
"Natural Law," at its best, represents a quest for justice, yielding
standards of justice and morality for critically evaluating the man-made
97. As to the need to recognize that there are irremediable inadequacies, see id.
at 3, 35, 47, 50-51, 61, 79, 88, 99, 185, 222, 424.
98. For a summary of suggested reforms to get rid of those that are remediable,
see id. at 422-23.
99. Address by Judge Learned Hand, Association of the Bar of the City of New
York, November 17, 1921, published as The Deficiecies of Trials to Reach the Heart
of the Matter, in 3 LEcruaRs oN LEGAI. Topics 89, 105 (1926).
100. For further discussion of the myth, see FRANIK, Courers ON TRIAL 222-25
(1949); Frank, Book Review, 13 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 369 (1948).
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legal rules and perhaps for ensuring a moderate amount of certainty
in those rules. That is, it aims at justice and moderate certainty in
the more or less abstract, generalized, human formulations of what men
may or may not lawfully do. But it furnishes no helpful standard for
evaluating the fact-determinations in most law suits and no assistance
in ensuring uniformity, certainty or predictability in such determina-
tions. To be practically meaningful, judicial justice must be justice
not merely in the abstract but in the concrete, in the court's decisions
of the numerous, particular, concrete cases. Thence arises the problem
of achieving justice, and uniformity, in court-room ascertainment of
facts in divers individual law suits. This problem can be solved via
natural law only in so far as natural-law principles operate on and
control the subjective, un-get-at-able, often unconscious and unstand-
ardized judicial findings of facts when testimony is conflicting as to
crucial issues of fact. I see no sign that those principles do so operate
and control. Consequently, natural law, too, will not solve these prob-
lems of "comparative law" caused by unruly fact-discretion.
THE EFFECT OF USING THE AMBIGUOUS WORD "LAW"
I suggest that a major obstacle to the ready perception of the
many difficulties which I've been discussing lies in that miserably
ambiguous word "law" in the labels "comparative law" and "foreign
law." Since "law" means to most lawyers the legal rules and principles,
it tends to blind most lawyers to all the circumambient unruly elements.
Consider Ehrenzweig. He is in the forefront of the rule-sceptics
in the field of conflict of laws. He sagaciously counsels that, even
within our own legal system, we should not accept any rigid, unified
theories or doctrines but should leave room for newly emerging social
policies."- But his stimulating, constructive scepticism includes no
whiff of fact-scepticism.
Much the same may be said at times, I think, of so astute a man
as Yntema. In 1937, he wisely wrote that " . . . awareness not
merely of the superficial dissimilarities of legal principles but more
particularly of the divergent denotations or qualifications of corre-
sponding legal terms is essential to the proper application of the perti-
nent foreign rule of decision." 102 But he made no mention of the impact
101. Ehrenzweig, Amwrican Coinflicts Law in Its Historical Perspective, 103
U. PA. L. REv. 133, 154-56 (1954).
102. Yntema, Roman Law as the Basis of Comparative Law, in 2 LAw: A CEN-
TmY OF PROGposs 346, 367 (Reppy ed. 1937).
He moved closer in 1944 to what I think the correct viewpoint-see Yntema,
Research in Inter-American Law at the University of Michigan, 43 MicH. L. REv.
549, 557 (1944)-but did not quite arrive.
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of divergent modes of trial, especially of divergent modes of "finding"
facts and the unruly aspects of such findings on the actual, specific,
judicial decisions in different countries.
This is surprising since he had written in 1928: " [O]f the
many things which have been said of the mystery of the judicial process,
the most salient is that decision is reached after an emotive experience in
which principles and logic play a secondary part. The function of ju-
ristic logic and the principles which it employs seem to be like that of
language, to describe the event which has already transpired. Those
considerations must reveal to us the impotence of general principles to
control decisions. Vague because of their generality, they mean noth-
ing save that they suggest in the organized experience of one who
thinks them, and because of their vagueness, they only remotely com-
pel the organization of that experience. The important problem in the
conflict of laws is not the formulation of the rule but the ascertainment
of the cases to which, and the extent to which, it applies. And this,
even if we are seeking uniformity in the administration of justice, will
lead us again to the circumstances of the concrete case, and to the
careful study of foreign practices. The reason why the general prin-
ciple cannot control is because it does not inform. . . . It should be
obvious that when we have observed a recurrent phenomenon in the
decisions of the courts, we may appropriately express the classification
thus adopted in a rule. But the rule will be only a mnemonic device,
a useful but hollow diagram of what has been. It will be intelligible
only if we relive again the experience of the classifier. . . . To de-
cide questions of this nature we must intimately probe the purposes and
the prejudices implicit in the judge's reaction to the concrete
case. . ." 10 That was surely a bold statement, indeed some-
thing of an over-statement. But it implied fact-scepticism and indi-
cated a perception of the gestalt in fact "finding." Did Yntema abandon
those insights after 1928?
LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE CIVILIANS
The blinding effect of legal rules and principles may well be the
result of our current American mode of legal education-another
major disservice of the civilians to common-law lawyers.
Langdell counseled against having American law teachers ex-
perienced "in dealing with men" or "in the trial and argument of
causes." He said that properly equipped teachers should have "not the
experience of the Roman advocate or of the Roman praetor but the
103. Yntema, The Hornbook Method and the Conflict of Laws, 37 YALE L.J. 468,480-81 (1928).
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experience of the Roman jurisconsult." I think that reference to the
"Roman jurisconsult" reveals the serious defect of the Langdell atti-
tude which still too much pervades American law schools. The juris-
consult was a man who seldom, if ever, tried a case or went to court.
It was his business to give answers to legal questions, answers based
upon assumed states of fact. He did not bother about the means of,
convincing a judex, through testimony, that those were the facts or
about the method by which the judex would reach that conclusion.
Such matters were beneath the dignity of the jurisconsult; he left
them to the trial lawyers and to the judex (or the magistrate).
Max Rheinstein, in a letter to me a few years ago, referring to
my attempt partially to explain by way of "modem legal magic" the
dominant American law school aversion to observation of trial courts,
offered a supplemental explanation: "In Rome, 'legal' activities were
divided up among three groups of men: the jurisconsults; the orators;
and practical politicians, statesmen, and, during the late empire, bureau-
cratic officials. The jurisconsults busied themselves exclusively with
the rules of law; the practical administration of justice remained outside
of their field. Yet, their work has become the foundation of all legal
science 104 ever since, not only in the countries of the so-called Civil but
also in the Common-Law orbit. The style of Common-Law legal
science was determined when Bracton started out to collect, arrange,
and expound the rules of the Common-Law of his time in the very
style of the Roman classics and the corpus juris. All the law books
since his time . . . have adhered to the pattern thus determined.
Legal education built upon these books has been equally limited; from
Pavia and Bologna to Harvard, Law Schools have regarded it as their
task to impart to their students a knowledge of the rules of law and
hardly anything else. Of course, for practical work in the administra-
tion of justice such a training is far from being complete." 105
"If," said Bentham in his Comment on the Commentaries, "there
be a case in which students stand in need of instruction, it is where the
generality of books that come into their hands represent things in a
different light from true ones. True it is that, after many errors and
disappointment, observation and practice may let a beginner into the
bottom of these mysteries; but what sort of an excuse is it to give for
feeding him with falsehood, that some time or other he may chance to
find out?"
104. I deplore this use of the word "science." FRANK, CoURs ON TRIAL c. 14
(1949) ; Frank, The Lawyer's Role in Modern Society, 4 J. PuB. L. 8 (1955).
105. These comments are at odds with Rheinstein's remark, see text at note 79
supra, about the similarity of "solutions" of problems "on both sides of the Atlantic."
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CREATIVE MISUNDERSTANDINGS
However, misunderstandings have often been creative. What men
erroneously believed to have happened in the past has often influenced
them far more than what in fact happened. Thus the false belief that
the Magna Carta granted the right to trial by jury gave considerable
encouragement to those Englishmen and Americans who espoused that
mode of trial; and thoroughly erroneous beliefs about ancient Roman
history inspired many subsequent undertakings.10
In the same way, a misunderstanding of foreign legal practices
sometimes has a curious effect. There are many instances of such
creative misunderstandings-which may be beneficent or evil. We
know that Montesquieu's misunderstanding of the English political
system brought about a widespread devotion to the separation-of-
powers idea, an idea which had both good and bad repercussions, and
with differences in its interpretation in France and the United States.
A belief that the English Act of Settlement of 1700 made all Eng-
lish judges independent has supported efforts to give all American
judges life tenure. But Lord Goddard, in an opinion in 1953,10 T re-
vealed that the overwhelming majority of English decisions in criminal
cases, and a multitude of such decisions in civil cases, come from judges
who have no such tenure.
It has been a common belief in this country that specific per-
formance of contracts is the exception in common-law countries, and
an award of damages the rule, but that the reverse is true in modern
civil-law countries. Huston, in 1915, wrote a book in which he so
maintained," 8 and Goldschmidt said much the same in 1937.109
Huston pointed to this alleged continental practice and, following
Story's lead, suggested that our courts might well grant specific per-
formance in most instances. But Pekelis, the brilliant civilian who
emigrated to the United States, informed us in 1943 that in France
and Italy, despite the wording of the codes, the courts do not send a
defendant to jail who disobeys a court order requiring specific per-
formance but allows him to pay damages in the last push."0  Kessler
tells me that Pekelis' description also describes the practice in Ger-
many."'
106. Dunning, Truth in History, 19 Am. HIST. REv. 217 (1914).
107. Terrell v. Secretary of State, [1953] 2 Q.B. 482-96.
108. HUSTON, ENFORCEMENT OF DECREES IN EQuITY 48-49 (1915).
109. GOLDSCHMIDr, ENGLISH LAW FROM TiE FOREIGN STANDPOINT 118-19 (1937).
110. PEKELIs, LAW AND SOCIAL ACTION 45-53 (1950) ; cf. Szladits, The Concept
of Specific Performance in Civil Law, 4 Am. J. Comp. L. 208, 218-19 (1955).
111. See also id. at 228.
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Here is a paradox: through continental canon law, the English
chancellor learned the technique of jailing contempt orders acting on
the person of the disobedient defendant, and our courts now employ
that technique frequently. Today on the European continent, a variety
of circumstances has yielded a different procedure. We are more
modem than the contemporary civilians-by being more old-fashioned.
THE VALUE OF CONTRASTIVE LAW
In the title "comparative law," we use the ambiguous word
"law." If we continue to use that word, at least a more preferable
adjective would be "contrastive," for often it is the contrasts be-
tween legal systems which are most educational. Each country, paro-
chially, ethnocentrically, tends to take its own legal methods for
granted, to think them the best conceivable. A look at those of other
lands stimulates self-criticism. For example, America's excessively
contentious trial procedure includes one device which most American
lawyers consider essential. I mean the way our lawyers interview
witnesses before trial with the consequence that the lawyers often in-
advertently "coach" a client or other friendly witnesses." There seems
to be no way of avoiding this undesirable result. But if we inquire,
we learn that due to Klein's reforms the lawyers in several continen-
tal countries usually may not engage in pre-trial interviewing of wit-
nesses in civil cases." 3 This suggests a possible reform of our practice.
Or consider the fact that generally in the United States a defend-
ant in a criminal case cannot obtain any knowledge before trial of most
of the evidence the prosecutor will offer. Such a procedure astonishes
civilians. It also surprises English lawyers, since modern England, in
an oblique way, has arrived at substantially the same method as the civil-
ian, i.e., pre-trial disclosure to the accused of the evidence against him
to be introduced at the trial. By contrasting the American with these
foreign practices, we may be shamed into reforming ours.
Our complacent satisfaction with our own ways needs to be dis-
turbed. That complacency stems from the unquestioning espousal of
the accustomed. We develop a "militant faith in [our own] bad solu-
tions." "' Writing of evils in much administration of criminal "jus-
tice," Chesterton exclaimed: "The horrible thing about all officials ...
is not that they are wicked (some of them are good), not that they
are stupid (some of them are quite intelligent), it is simply that they
112. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 86 (1949).
113. Lenhoff, The Law of Evidence, 1 Am. J. ComP. L. 313, 342, 343 (1949).
114. FEIBLEMAN, FREEDOM AND AUTHORY IN OUR TIME 1939 (1953).
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have got used to it." 115 Disorientation, by studying foreign ways, may
get us un-used to some of our own that sorely need overhauling.
Transplanting-Its Dangers
Yet, although borrowing may sometimes be wise, often a danger
lurks in transferring a legal rule or practice to an alien culture. We
may find a parable in the fact that rabbits, harmless in their native
habitat, when imported into Australia turned out to be a menace to
Australian farmers." 6  We should note too the biologist's report that
"identical living cells develop differently in different parts of the
organism," and that, so some believe, cancer is caused by the unregu-
lated growth and spread of normal cells. Mark Twain, somewhat ex-
aggeratedly to be sure, asserted that the European idea of medieval
chivalry as depicted in Sir Walter Scott's novels, when imported into
the ante-bellum American South, brought on our Civil War. Scott,
said Twain in the 1860's, ". . . had so large a hand in making
Southern character . . . that he is in great measure responsible for
the war." 117
The danger of transplanting may be particularly great when a
large segment of a foreign legal system is suddenly transplanted. It
may give the importing country something like the "bends"-a grave
ailment experienced by a man who too rapidly emerges from an area
of high atmospheric pressure to one of much lower pressure. Perhaps
that's what happened in pre-communist China when, still a seemingly
backward country, it adopted a large portion of modern occidental
procedures.1"
On the other hand, our courts could learn much from the tradi-
tional Chinese idea that the judge must treat all legal principles as
mere general guides to be applied always equitably with primary atten-
115. CHESTERTON, TREmous Tatnzs 85-86 (1909).
116. Frank, A Conflict With Oblivion: Some Observations on the Founders of
Legal Pragmatism, 9 RuTGms L. REv. 425, 426 (1954); Frank, Some Tame Reflec-
tions on Some Wild Facts, in VISION AND AcTION 56 (1953); FRANK, FATE AND
Faznom 61 (1945).
117. Osmaxwls, ROMANTICISM AND NATIONALISM IN THE OLD SOUTH 50 (1949);
cf. Kliger, Emerson and the Usable Anglo-Saxon Past, 16 J. HIST. OF IDEAs 476,
489-90 (1955).
118. The adjective "backward" may be most unfair. In 1948, two Chinese
graduate students at Yale Law School wrote a paper for me in which they said, "It
is a superficial observation that the Chinese legal system has been found suitable
only because the Chinese civilization is less advanced. The Romans developed their
legal system at a time when their civilization, while unique and flourishing, was
not particularly to be envied in comparison with Chinese civilization. In the fourth
and third centuries .B.C., China had a theory of law-that of the so-called Legists-
quite akin to that of the German scholars during the 19th century A.D. But Con-
fucianism led to the abandonment of that theory in China many centuries ago."
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tion to the unique factors of the particular cases." 9 We often achieve
the same result surreptitiously by means of the fact-discretion of our
trial judges and juries. I think it would be wiser if we did so can-
didly.1
20
Borrowed Principles As Sometimes Too Authoritarian
The Romanists, ignoring the fact-discretion of the judex, con-
centrated on legal principles. This prompts the suggestion that the
word "principles" seems to derive from the same word as "princes"
(powerful monarchs), and that legal principles, undemocratically, may
become authoritarian. "For, with its stress on uniformity, a legal
generalization (or principle) tends to become totalitarian in its atti-
tude towards uniqueness." 121 Maybe this should be coupled with the
fact that Justinian's Institutes ". . . were written after more than
three centuries of open and avowed dictatorship." 122 I do not ask
you to take this suggestion too seriously.
Nevertheless, recognizing that they can become authoritarian, we
should exercise caution in adopting outright any foreign legal prin-
ciples, For example, the "moral right of authors," expressive of a de-
sirable viewpoint towards which many American courts have been too
snobbish, ought not, I think, be accepted here wholesale."
Kahn-Fraund, commenting on this article, says in a letter to me,
that he is very largely in agreement with me on the limited value of
comparative law for practical purposes, but that he believes "a com-
parison of legal institutions in practice in different jurisdictions is of
interest in that it shows what questions are considered as legal questions
in one area and as non-legal questions in another," for frequently "a
legal problem is not intrinsically so, but only owing to the historical and
social environment in which the problem has to be solved."
Further Difficulties of Transplanting
The uncritical adoption of a foreign legal device will often trans-
mute it. In the course of transportation, it may suffer a sea change.
At home it is surrounded by many usages which are never written
down but taken for granted and more or less unconsciously accepted,
119. FRAN , CounTs ON TRrA 381-82 (1949).
120. Id. at 409-10; cf. id. at 132-33. Wigmore who, through his spell of teaching
in the Orient, knew well the Chinese approach, at times applauded it.
121. Guiseppi v. Walling, 144 F.2d 608, 618-19 (2d Cir. 1944).
122. Radin, A Glimpse of Roman Law, 45 CLAssicAL J. 71, 72 (1949).
123. See concurring opinion in Granz v. Harris, 198 F2d 585, 590 (2d Cir.
1952).
"COMPARATIVE" AND "CONTRASTIVE" LAW
thus checking its unwise use. But those checks can seldom be ex-
ported. They are not negotiable internationally.
Holmes, in a judical opinion in 1923, discussing the difficulty
American courts experience in reviewing decisions of Puerto Rican
courts, said: "When we contemplate such a system from outside, it
seems like a wall of stone, every part even with all the others.
But to one brought up within it, varying emphasis, tacit assumptions,
unwritten practices, a thousand inferences gained only from life, may
give to the different parts wholly new values that logic and grammar
never could get from the books." " Since then, others such as White-
head 125 have similarly remarked. In 1954, the anthropologist Mur-
dock chided some of his fellow-anthropologists for looking solely to
the "patterned norms" of alien cultures and neglecting the "unpatterned
behavior," the "variations and deviations." 126 The "axioms" or un-
questioned assumptions of an alien culture, in order to be understood
must be experienced in their setting, must be "proved upon our
pulses." 127
The more sagacious students of comparative politics appreciate
this fact.' They point to the way the English parliamentary system
or the American constitutional scheme, glossed by many domestic
usages, becomes something very different when other countries, igno-
rant of those usages, purported to adopt it.
Such transplanting is an instance of what the anthropologists
term "diffusion." The anthropologists can teach lawyers that the
effects of diffusion are not always salutary.
The Communication Problem and Semantic Scepticism
We have difficulty even within our own culture in understanding
past usages, the unwritten assumptions of an earlier period. J. Dover
Wilson warns that, in reading Hamlet, we are likely to overlook "those
tacit understandings between Shakespeare and his audience" which
were "part of the atmosphere of the time." 129 So we misinterpret
124. Diaz v. Gonzales, 261 U.S. 102, 106 (1923).
125. WHITEHEAD, SCIENCE AND THE MODERN WORLD (1925).
126. Mtmnocx, FOR A SCIENCE OF MAN 14, 22-23 (1954).
127. "We must," wrote Julius Stone in 1951, "study the history, the politics, the
economics, the cultural background in literature and the arts, the religious beliefs
and practices, the philosophies, if we are to reach sound solutions as to what is and
what is not common." Stone, The End To Be Served by Comparative Law, 25 TUL.
L. Rzv. 325, 332 (1951). See also Bebr, Book Review, 64 YAE L.J. 954, 955
(1951).
128. Cf. McWhinney, Book Review, 52 COLUm. L. REv. 553 (1952).
129. Wn.soN, WHAT HAPPENED iN HAMLET 26-27 (1935).
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Shakespeare's line, "Get thee to a nunnery," if we don't know the col-
loquial meaning of "nunnery" in the days of the English Reformation.
Even the lapse of a few decades may make past writings almost
unintelligible. "A hundred years hence. . .," comments Wilson,
"readers of Edwardian plays like Major Barbara and The Voysey In-
heritance will unconsciously miss a great deal through inability to
understand the economic facts which Bernard Shaw and Granville-
Barker assumed, but never spoke of, because they knew their audience
would assume them likewise." '
We are wont to believe that we "modems" are unusually sceptical.
But about two centuries ago, an English judge exclaimed in some dis-
tress: "We live in an age when men are apt to bring those things into
question, of which our ancestors never doubted."
So with semantic scepticism. Francis Bacon, Hobbes, Locke and
Berkeley were masters of it. Pascal observed that "all men who say
the same things do not possess them in the same way." Justice John-
son, in an opinion in 1816, said: "Language is essentially defective in
precision, more so than those who are not in the habit of subjecting it
to philological analysis are aware." " But in our times, such scepti-
cism has waxed. We have come to doubt whether words alone can
adequately communicate. The poet Trumball Stickney expressed this
doubt thus: "You lean over my meaning's edge and feel.-A dizziness
of the things I have not said." We have learned to reject the "com-
placent belief" that invariably we understand what others say to us.1
8 2
For, from such complacency, there ensues an illusion of communication,
and men often fail to understand one another just because they are too
sure they do.
At best, communication is but an approximation. "To each of
his friends, even to his closest friends," writes Schlauch, "a man talks
out of a private world of his own. . . . It is impossible for any two
persons ever to have learned the same work under the same circum-
stances, occupying . . . the same space in time, and apprehending
the . . . term with precisely the same background." "'
If there be these obstacles to understanding as between two men
of the same culture, how much greater will be such hindrances as be-
tween those of different cultures? Each language, in its peculiar
130. Ibid. I think the idea of the Zeit-Geist can be and often has been over-
worked. In a given time and place, there are dozens of Time Spirits. FRANK, FATE
AND FREEDom c. 7 (1945); Frank, A Sketch of an Influence, in MODERN INTER'RE-
TATIONS OF LEGAL PHILOSOPHIES 188, 217-18 (1947).
131. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat) 304, 374 (1816).
132. The Times Lit. Supp. (London), Oct. 27, 1950, p. 1669, col. 2.
133. ScnLAucH, THE GIFT oF TONGUES 113 (1948).
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-structure, embodies a world outlook different from that embodied in
another language. Men of divers languages often talk past one an-
other. They encounter a baffling sort of dialectic of dialects. It has
been said that "the philosophers meet, not their philosophies." The
same is often true of men of different countries who gather to discuss
"comparative law."
Other Dangers of Transplanting
Occasionally, a legal device even in its home-land produces unin-
tended, sometimes undesirable, results. The foreign borrowers may
be ignorant of those untoward consequences. Unknown to those bor-
rowers, by the time the borrowing happens, the legal device may be in
disrepute in its native haunts.
In addition, the borrowers sometimes deem the foreign device
socially valuable because it has been touted enthusiastically by some
foreign lawyer. But that enthusiastic foreign lawyer may be a mere
bookish man who is not cognizant of the social workings of that de-
vice. He may ignore important nuances, being intent on over-simpli-
fication and thus incapable of seeing complexities. He may be like
Chief Justice Chase of whom someone said: "With him self-delusion
was almost a talent." He may impute to his countrymen his own
idiosyncratic values: "Poor Richard Lovatt," writes D. H. Lawrence
in one of his novels, "wearied himself to death with the problem of
himself; calling it Australia."
What's more, lawyers as a group may be inadequately sensitive
to the social consequences of legal rules. As a specialist group, an
"apart group," lawyers tend to have limited perspectives, restricted
horizons, unique attentional attitudes, their own carved-out province
or sub-universe, with its special presuppositions or "quasi-realities"
and with its particularistic "just-so stories" which the lawyers endow
with the "accent of reality." '" Many lawyers suffer from what Veblen
called "trained incapacity" and Dewey "occupational psychosis," i.e.,
their very skills function, outside the professional area, as inadequacies
or blind spots. As Kenneth Burke puts it, men ". . . may be unfitted
by being fit in an unfit fitness." So foreign lawyers may misinform
us concerning the actual social values and disvalues of their country's
legal institutions.
With all the foregoing in mind, one may say of many borrowed
segments of a foreign legal system what someone said of those who at-
134. FRAN, CoURTs ON TaIAL 399-400 (1949) ; Cf. FOSS, SYMBOL AND METAPHOR
30 (1949) : "Who chooses a profession settles down in it and outlines, once and'for all,
certain limits to his activity."
920 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 104
tempted to imitate Chekhov: "Nothing, after all, is so unlike an original
as a copy."
"'Sociology of Law"
In 1748, Montesquieu in Book 29 of his Spirit of Laws ..5 made
some shrewd observations. He said that "laws which appear the same
have not always the same effect" and are "sometimes very different."
He also noted that "laws which seem contrary proceed sometimes
from the same spirit," and he showed that accordingly they might have
the same effect. Any law, he insisted, must be viewed as part of its
own system.
In this and other ways, he may be said to have anticipated in some
considerable measure the "sociology of law" and much of that "realism
in comparative law" of which recently Brutau has brilliantly written."3 6
However, to recur to what I noted earlier, Montesquieu's modern
disciples have overlooked the unruly factors which determine how, in
their application in litigation, laws are actually interpreted.
Undetected Puns
Lepaulle, echoing Montesquieu, said that the similarity in the laws
of two countries ". . . may be due to the purest coincidence-no
more significant than the double meaning of a pun." 137 On the other
hand, the very adoption of a foreign legal provision may have been due
to the fact that its words had a double (or multiple) meaning, a pun-,
ning character.
A law or rule or principle, whether imported or domestic, often
in its vagueness or ambiguity contains an undetected pun. Undetected
puns in legal systems as elsewhere may stimulate growth, either good
or bad. For a hidden pun is kin to a buried metaphor or an unrecog-
nized fiction."8 It has a latent ambiguity, and sometimes there are
135. 2 MONTESQUIEU, SPIRIT OF LAWS 156-62 (Nugent transl. 1949).
136. Brutau, Realism in Comparative Law, 3 Am. J. ComP. L. 42 (1954).
137. Lepaulle, The Function of Comparative Law, 35 HARv. L. REv. 838, 853
(1922): "An identical provision of the law of two countries may have wholly dif-
ferent moral backgrounds, may have been brought about by the interplay of wholly
different forces, and hence the similarity may be due to the purest coincidence-no
more significarit than the double meaning of a pun."
138. For more extensive discussion of this theme, see Frank, Some Tame Reflec-
tions on Some Wild Facts, in VISION AND ACTION 56, 61-62, 71-72, 75 (1953) ; Larson
v. Jo-Ann Cab Corp., 209 F.2d 929, 932 & nn.9-16 (2d Cir. 1954) ; cf. Brutau, Realism
in Comparative Law, 3 Am. J. ComP. L. 42, 51, 53 (1954).
As to "fictions," see FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 37-41, 166-67, 312-22
(1930); Fuller, Legal Fictions, 25 ILL. L. REv. 363, 513, 877 (1930); TOTRTOUL.ON,
PHILOSOPHY IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF LAW 293-96, 383-99 (Read transl. 1922);
Doehler Metal Furniture Co. v. United States, 149 F.2d 130, 133-34 & n.3 (2d Cir.
1945); United Shipyards v. Hoey, 131 F.2d 525, 526-27 (2d Cir. 1942); Hammond-
Knowlton v. United States, 121 F.2d 192, 199 (2d Cir. 1941).
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valuable "resources of ambiguity" which the more naive semanticists
do not perceive. Thus, often the ability of courts to adapt old legal
rules to changed conditions is ". . . due to the fact that the same
norm is used but with a changing meaning, the same verbal formulas
with an apparent identity which is verbal only." '
The moral for students of "private international law" is crisply
stated by Salenga, who writes "that the mere adoption of a uniform set
of technical propositions does not secure uniformity in the treatment
of conflict problems, for verbal symbols have been, and will be, used,
by various-oftentimes the same-courts to mean different things, to
lead to different ends. Hence, any constructive effort to adhieve a
common outlook on conflict problems must go beyond the mere em-
ployment of common symbols and technical problems." 140
Proposals for a Unified Legal Language
It should also be obvious that a unified international legal lan-
guage, a lawyers' Esperanto, will not create uniformity of decisions.
Perhaps the movement among civilians for such a word-unification gets
its impetus from the fact that in many continental countries no judge
on a collegial court is allowed to publish a dissent, so that a false facade
of unity is erected around decisions.
Moreover, world-wide word-unification, if it did succeed in
achieving its sponsors' aims, might be pernicious by preventing desir-
able innovations. Orwell, in his terrifying book 1984, depected such
a language called "Newspeak." All "ambiguities and shades of mean-
ing were purged out of" words. The "vocabulary grew smaller, in-
stead of larger, every year. . . A Newspeak word . . was
simply a staccato sound expressing one clearly understood concept."
Horace Kallen, criticizing the movement for the "unification of the
sciences" and its correlative "unified" language, warns that it has its
roots in a dread of variety, novelty, in a "compensatory passion . . .
for a One to Rule over the Many," which issues in the stifling har-
monies of a closed system. 41
"Reception" As Contagion
Carstens, a German graduate law student at Yale in 1949, came up
with this interesting idea. He quoted Goethe's lines in Faust, which
139. Stone, Fallacies of the Logical Form, in MODERN INTERPRETATIONS OF
LEGAL PHiLOSOPHY 696, 721 (1947). See also FRANK, CouRTs ON TRIAL 276-78
(1949); FRANKc, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 22-31, 57-61, 293 (1930); LEVI, AN
INTRODUCTION To LEGAL REASONING (1949).
140. SALONGA, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 432 (1950).
141. Kallen, The Meanings of Unity Among the Sciences, in STRUCTURE, METHOD
AND MANING 225 (1951).
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he translated thus: "All rights and laws are 'still transmitted like an
eternal sickness of the race, from generation into generation fitted, and
shifted round from place to place." He remarked that, if we look at
"law" as a sickness, it is not only hereditary but contagious, and that
the "reception" of a foreign law is the consequence of a sort of con-
tagion. "The admiration for the supposedly better law," he wrote, "is
so great that the receiving country does not realize its shortcomings
in its native land."
This he said in speaking of the adoption on the continent of trial
by jury in criminal cases. Indeed, there we have an instance of an in-
fection which caused much anguish, but from which the continentals
have now pretty well recovered. England too has almost got rid of
that native "jury-disease," while we still are in its throes.
Codification
I turn to another instance of foreign contagion: the example of
the civilians has recurrently incited some common-law lawyers to ex-
periment with the codification of our laws. The experiments have
seldom proved successful, partly because most of our judges and law-
yers, trained as they were, have been unsympathetic, and partly because
many American codifiers have fatuously thought that a code could and
would produce legal certainty and get rid of all judicial legislation.
The wise civilians know that no code can achieve those ends, that an
effective code must seek simplicity and flexibility, not detailed, complete
regulation.'2
I was amused when, in 1953, an ardent sponsor of the new Ameri-
can Uniform Commercial Code, in an article answering a critic, used a
locution which thirty years earlier would have been denounced as un-
grammatical." If our grammar had been codified three decades ago,
he could not properly have written as he did. In 1868, an American
lawyer sagely observed: "Who can tell in what net of legal principles
we should be enmeshed, if the sages of the fourteenth, the seventeenth
or the eighteenth century could have decided our probable cases in ad-
vance for us?" '" You'll recall that Cardozo held that the Uniform
Negotiable Instruments Law had stunted the growth, via changing
customs, of one codified rule of commercial law. 45
142. FRANK, LAw AND THE MODERN MIND 186-92, 310-11 (1930); FRANK,
COURTS ON TRIAL 290-91 (1949).
143. Gilmore, The Uniform Commercial Code, 61 YALE LJ. 364, 365 (1952):
"No one-certainly not I-pretends that .. ."
144. Quoted by Hammond in his edition of LiaE, HEU -NEUTiCS 32 n.9 (3d ed.
1880); see also FRANx, IF MEN WERE ANGELS 313-14 (1942).
145. Manhattan Co. v. Morgan, 242 N.Y. 38, 150 N.E. 594 (1926).
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The civilians have learned how to work as well as how to write a
code. I, for one, gravely doubt whether this country can adapt itself
to codification except in some particular, restricted areas.
Codes and Stare Decisis
The fact that the civilians deal with codes has led some naive
lawyers to believe that we basically differ from the civilians in our use
of court decisions as precedents. Sophisticated lawyers know that dif-
ference has been much exaggerated.
I remember a prominent German lawyer who visited me in the
1920's when I was still in practice. He asked me to explain how we
use our law books. I took him to our office library, showed him the
court reports and the West Digest. "Good heavens," he asked scorn-
fully, "You mean that, to answer a legal question, you must read so
many court opinions?" He spoke as if we were utter barbarians.
Guilefully, I enquired, "And how do you go about it?" "Why," he
replied, "we just look at the Code." "Is that all?" "Well, we look
too at the commentaries." "And never at any judicial decisions?"
"Oh, yes, we do that, too."
But myths die hard. In 1954 a well-known American lawyer
wrote that, in France, "judges decide the case before them and that
alone, and on its own merits, and not on the authority of any prior or
similar cause." 14' He went on to say that the French systegn is based
primarily on logic, the American system on experience. This re-
mark is akin to the recent howler of another learned American law-
yer-that no continental legal system recognizes the "presumption of
innocence." 147
THE AFFIRMATIVE CONTRIBUTIONS OF CONTRASTIVE
AND COMPARATIVE LAW
Eder has said, "The most valuable contribution that comparative
studies can make is perhaps a negative one," that "comparative law
teaches us, by the light of costly experience in other countries, what to
avoid." 148
I think that too pessimistic an attitude. It insufficiently recog-
nizes the healthy, affirmative and educative worth of "contrastive law."
It turns its back on the possibility and the desirability of not only
146. The Two Great Systems of Law of the World, address by Grossman,
Harvard Club, New York City, April 30, 1954.
147. WoRmsER, TEE LAW 137 (1949).
148. EDER, A COPARATIVE SuRVEY OF ANGLo-AMEICAN AND LATIN-AMERICAN
LAW 157 (1950).
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revealing, but also of increasing, common international perspectives
and agreements on this troubled planet, a gospel valiantly preached by
McDougal and his aides.
149
Here, international standardized contracts, cooperatively drafted,
may in a humble way accomplish much by building some sort of an in-
ternational "living law" and thus quietly creating part of the founda-
tion of a world community. Such instruments to be sure, if imposed
on those with weak bargaining power, may prove baneful, but may
work beneficently when the parties have approximately equal economic
strength. Let us not forget, however, that if those contracts get into
litigation in the courts of divers countries, the decisions may not be uni-
form because of the differences in "fact-finding" methods, so that
seeming uniformity may prove illusory.
An Unfinished Symphony
Let us beware of the dangerous infectious aspects of "receptions."
Beware, above all, of the totalitarian evils of an excessive planetary
uniformity which would efface desirable differences in cultural values
and monopolistically obstruct local originalities, initiatives, inventive
creations. "Harmonization," a "democratic world order," these words
symbolize an imperative need. But there remains, and I'm sure Mc-
Dougal and Northrop 150 agree, an ultimate wisdom in Horace Kallen's
oft-repeated warning that true democracy calls for an orchestration of
differing attitudes-in which some unresolved cacophonies play a
part-not for a stifling regimented unity. 5' A democratic global sym-
phony should always be an unfinished symphony.
149. McDougal, The Comparative Study of Law for Value Clarification as an
Instrument of Democratic World Order, 61 YALE L.J. 915 (1952); Bebr, Book
Review, 64 YALE L.J. 954, 959 (1955); cf. SALONGA, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
397, 434 (Supp. 1950); STONE, THE EiD To BE SERVED BY COMPARATIVE LAW 325,
334-35 (1951).
150. NORTHROP, THE MEETING OF EAST AND WEST (1946).
151. KALLEN, THE EDUCATION OF FREE MEN 117 (1949); KALLEN, THE LIBERaJL
SPIRIT 190 (1948); cf. Kallen, The Meanings of "Unity" Among the Sciences,
6 PHIL. AND PHENOm. RESEARCH 493, 495-96, 523 (1946); Ross, INTERNATIONAL
LAW CC. 1 & 2 (1947).
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APPENDIX
I. "FACT-DIsCRETION" AND THaE UPPER COURTS-
SOME QUALIFICATIONS
Statements in the foregoing re "fact-discretion" need some quali-
fications:
1. When the conflicting testimony is oral, seldom can the upper
court, on an appeal, revise or correct the trial court's discretion in
"finding" facts, if there is substantial oral testimony to support the
findings. For the upper court cannot observe the demeanor of the
orally testifying witnesses, and therefore cannot disturb the trial court's
credibility-evaluations.
When, however, the testimony is not oral, the upper court can re-
ject the trial court's "findings" and make its own."6 This is often the
situation in civil law countries.
2. Even when the testimony is oral, the trial court's finding may
be reviewable, to some extent, on appeal:
(a) It is reviewable, if based on oral testimony that is so
patently ridiculous as to be incredible. 53
(b) A trial court's finding may include two different kinds
of fact:
(1) The trial court, if it believes a witness' oral state-
ment of a fact, infers from that statement that it is a fact.
Such an inference may be called a "testimonial inference."
As such an inference involves an evaluation of the witness'
credibility, based in part on his demeanor, usually a fact thus
inferred will be accepted by an upper court.
(2) From facts ascertained through "testimonial in-
ferences," a trial court will often infer the existence of other
facts to which no one testified. A finding of such facts results
from what may be called "derivative inferences." As the
finding of any such fact does not involve the trial court's
evaluation of any witness' demeanor, the upper court may
reject a finding of such a fact, and substitute its own finding,
via its own "derivative inferences." This it should always do
if the trial court's derivative inferences are irrational. It may
also do so-unless the fact-finder was a jury or perhaps an ad-
ministrative agency-if other alternative equally rational
derivative inferences are open.15 4
152. See, e.g., Orvis v. Higgins, 180 F.2d 537 (2d Cir. 1950).
153. See, e.g., Gindorff v. Prince, 189 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1951).
154. See, e.g., American Tobacco Co. v. The Katingo Hadjipatera, 194 F.2d 449,
451 (2d Cir. 1951) ; In re Kellett Aircraft Corp., 186 F.2d 197, 200 (3d Cir. 1950) ;
E. F. Drew & Co. v. Reinhard, 170 F.Zd 679, 684 (2d Cir. 1948); Kuhn v. Princess
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(c) An upper court may reject any finding of fact as ir-
relevant with reference to what it holds to be the correctly ap-
plicable legal rule.
(d) An upper court, in applying and thus interpreting the
correctly applicable legal rule, may "interpret" the facts as "found"
by the trial court. In this way, the facts as "found" and the legal
rules interact.'55 This sort of interaction, however, should not be
confused with a trial court's gestalt.'56
II. ORAL TESTIMONY AND "DEMEANOR EVIDENCE"
Most Anglo-American judges and other legal thinkers believe
(and I agree) that a trial court's observation of the demeanor of wit-
nesses while orally testifying has much value in aiding the trial court
to evaluate the witness' credibility. It must be confessed, however,
that sometimes such "demeanor evidence" may be deceptive.'ST
Lie Detectors
Our courts generally are still sceptical about the efficacy of so-
called lie-detectors. However, it is possible that such devices will im-
prove sufficiently to overcome this scepticism.
But those devices will not do away with the effects of an honest
witness' initial errors in observing the past events concerning which
he testifies. Those devices also seem most unlikely to meet the dif-
ficulties caused by an honest witness' mistakes of memory or those
due to his unconscious prejudices.
Lida of Thurn & Taxis, 119 F.2d 704, 705 (3d Cir. 1941); NLRB v. Universal
Camera Corp., 190 F.2d 429 (2d Cir. 1951) (concurring opinion); Wabash Corp. v.
Ross Electric Corp., 187 F.2d 577, 601-03 (2d Cir. 1951) (dissenting opinion) ; Frank,
"Short of Sickness and Death": A Study of Moral Responsibility in Legal Criticism,
26 N.Y.U.L. REV. 546, 561-62, 583-84 (1951).
155. See, e.g., Frank, "Short of Sickness and Death": A Study of Moral Respon-
sibility in Legal Criticism, 26 N.Y.U.L. REv. 545, 586-90, 592-95 (1951) ; cf. LEVI, AN
INTRODUCTION To LEGAL REASONING (1949) ; Wurzel, Methods of Juridical Thinking,
in TaE ScIENcE OF LEGAL METHOD 286, 340-48 (1917); Paul, Dobson v. Commis-
sioner: The Strange Ways of Law and Fact, 57 HAxv. L. REv. 753 (1944).
156. See Frank, "Short of Sickness and Death": A Study of Moral Responsibility
in Legal Criticism, 26 N.Y.U.L. REv. 545, 595 (1951).
157. See, e.g., Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Havana Madrid Restaurant Corp., 175
F.2d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 1949).
